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BOOK REVIEW
Within the Confines of the Law: Abortion and a
Substantive Rhetoric of Liberty
REVIEW OF Laurence H. Tribe's Abortion: the Clash of Absolutes
CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT*
Books about abortion end weakly. The nature of the issue almost
inevitably leads one to slanted tirades, contorted posturing, or feeble
pleas for tolerance. The conclusion to Professor Laurence H. Tribe's'
new book about abortion takes the latter, most academically respectable,
of these alternatives. This choice reflects a serious core weakness-
Tribe's book does not advance us to new ground in the debate. In spite
of this failing, Abortion: The Clash ofAbsolutes2 is a broadly useful book;
one would hope it might even become a socially important book.
Professor Tribe's contribution to the abortion debate includes a
sound (if slightly slanted) historical overview, an excellent chapter com-
paring abortion laws and customs internationally, a good (if definitely
slanted) recounting of abortion politics in the seventies and eighties, and
the most detailed and broad defense of the constitutional soundness of
Roe v. Wade3 that I have read.
In covering this ground, The Clash of Absolutes rarely strikes an
original note. Mostly, Tribe gathers the analyses of feminist activists,
women's studies scholars, political theorists, and other lawyers. That he
presents these arguments in a systematic and incisive manner is useful,
but the crucial factor that gives this book socio-political importance is
that it is Tribe who is doing the presenting. The extended and visible
defense of Roe by a widely respected Harvard Law Professor (a person
* Associate Professor Department of Speech Communication University of Georgia Athens,
GA.
1. Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School.
2. L.H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990).
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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who is himself well-qualified to hold a Supreme Court berth) has the
chance of carrying far more weight than all of the articles by feminists,
women's studies scholars, and disaffected lawyers thrown together. In
the face of the vociferous and plentiful attacks by conservative legal
scholars on Roe, such a defense is vital. Although Supreme Court Jus-
tices and their clerks considering the fate of Roe may not be inclined to
listen to the rest of the "democratic mob" outside their doors, one would
hope that they would at least feel compelled to give Tribe a hearing.
If read seriously by the right people, Tribe's book may therefore be
useful in maintaining, or eventually re-establishing, the liberty of women.
This is the case largely because Tribe's constitutional argument is sound.
Tribe outlines most of the reasons why a decision abrogating Roe would
be inconsistent with a government of individual liberty and equality. In
spite of all this, Professor Tribe's book could have done more. Ulti-
mately, a Harvard Law Professor is writing this kind of book on abortion
because the issue is fundamental; that is, it presents to the Court a chal-
lenge to the entire construction of legal liberalism as the protection of
individual rights. As I will suggest below, the development of the abor-
tion controversy has revealed that if women are to be protected by our
Constitution, laissez-faire liberalism must give way to substantive liber-
alism. By focusing his attention within excessively narrow limits, Profes-
sor Tribe skates around this chasm in the legal structure, and ends up
making a crucial error about the direction in which the Court is going.
The basic limitation in Tribe's analysis arises from the relationship
he perceives between law and society. As is common today, he relates
law to short-term electoral and legislative politics, rather than to long-
term processes of social change. Consequently, he focuses his attention
on the goal of persuading activists,4 rather than on an address to the
broader, less rabidly entrenched public. Like many scholars and journal-
ists, Tribe frames the abortion issue in terms of the incommensurability
of the activists' positions, rather than in terms of the mixed and changing
ideological components held by the public at large. It is, however, only
by focusing on the mixed ideological frames of the public that one can see
the compromises that Tribe proposes as true solutions to the abortion
problem. Birth control, which provides a better means for reducing
abortion than does criminalization, would not placate the Right-to-lifers,
but it might come to satisfy the majority of the citizens of the United
4. See, e.g., L.H. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 6, 8.
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States.5 Tribe thus sets off after the wrong quarry; the abortion contro-
versy is not a clash of absolutes; it is a clash of absolutists.
Tribe's legal-political blinders thus lead him to mistake the essence
of the controversy. The interests at stake in the abortion controversy are
not, as he would have it, "women's liberty" vs. the "life of the fetus."
Instead, it is the liberty of wage-laboring women (those who make their
identity as much or more from their wage labor as from their maternal
labor), against the economic interests of all those groups who would bind
these women as the producers of "potential human life."6 Tribe attends
too much to the propositions that have been explicitly advanced by the
partisan advocates, and not enough to their broader motive structures.7
This leads to a basic misanalysis of the electoral issue as well. Tribe,
like many Pro-choice activists, paints an excessively rosy picture of the
current stasis of the issue in the minds of the electorate." The best we can
say is that the public is thoroughly fractured and ambivalent about this
issue, and may eventually come to appreciate the value of women's lib-
erty. The worst we can say, as Tribe's own citation of polls indicates,9 is
that the majority of the populace supports many restrictions on abortion
rights and therefore does not support full liberty for women. The public
is joined by at least four Supreme Court Justices.
Tribe fails to attack this central issue because he is bound, perhaps
against his own conscious intentions, within the tradition-regimented,
deductivist approach to the law. Tribe's book, while it does not read like
5. Imagine an opinion poll which asked, "Which of the following provides the best means of
reducing abortion: criminalization, improved birth control, or maternity support?"
6. These groups include "traditional women" for whom laws premised upon "women as
mothers" will favor their interests, whereas laws premised on "women as persons with choices" will
not as directly favor their interests. They also include conservative churches, who are interested in
perpetuating established social order through established moral codes, as well as those men who
profit from having parenting assigned to women as an unwaged labor.. For analysis of these groups
see K. LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984); M. FALIK, IDEOLOGY AND
ABORTION POLICY POLITICS (1983).
7. As Luker and Falik's studies indicate, supra note 6, these motive structures are not "irrele-
vant" background details of interest only to historians. The motive structures are directly expressed
in the discourse itself and they are essential to its argumentative soundness. See C.M. CONDIT,
DECODING ABORTION RHETORIC: COMMUNICATING SOCIAL CHANGE (1990). A brief discussion
of motive structure as a way of reading discourse in place of argumentative perspectives is provided
below with regards to constitutionalism, see infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text, but for more
depth see K. BURKE, PERMANENCE AND CHANGE: AN ANATOMY OF PURPOSE (1984); K. BURKE,
LANGUAGE AS SYMBOLIC ACION: ESSAYS ON LIFE, LITERATURE, AND METHOD (1966); K.
BURKE, A RHETORIC OF MoTivEs (1969). See also W.R. FISHER, HUMAN COMMUNICATION AS
NARRATION: TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF REASON, VALUE AND ACTION (1987).
8. See, eg., L.H. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 193.
9. Id. at 232.
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a lawyer's brief, nonetheless is structured by sets of inter-connected
sorites. More crucially, he does not, and cannot within received jurispru-
dential theory, admit that the concept of liberty for women is newly val-
ued in America. For the majority of recorded human history around the
globe, women were not perceived as self-actualizing individuals who
might appropriately have liberty and human rights. Only in the 20th
century have a significant minority begun to argue widely and publicly
that the concept of women's liberty ought to be one of our fundamental
collective values. It is unclear exactly how widespread the adherence to
this value is, but at the least we can say that most people do not endorse
many of the functional consequents of the principle. Tribe's book acts as
though women's liberty is a universally shared notion, which can there-
fore serve as a deductive premise upon which abortion rights can be
established.
This may seem like a tactically sound strategy. It is unlikely that
any Supreme Court Justice will openly deny that women should have
liberty under our form of government, though they may hedge on how
"fundamental" liberty is. If one could then simply deduce abortion
rights, even the most conservative Justices would be obliged to go along
with Roe v. Wade, or even with a decision more radical. However, value
terms such as "Liberty" only have meaning through their relationship to
prior usages and to other linguistic components of the public vocabulary
(especially other values, narratives, and characterizations).10 Because
women's Liberty is a newcomer to our political vocabulary, there are few
of these prior and related usages to call upon in making the link between
abortion and Liberty. If one is going to make a sound argument that
women ought to have Liberty and that this entails abortion rights, one
must, therefore, admit that this entails a social change of serious mo-
ment. For women to have Liberty entails not only massive economic
shifts, but also major shifts in the ways in which we will reproduce and
rear future generations, thereby ensuring the survival of the society and
the species. To reallocate responsibility for the reproduction of the spe-
cies from a de facto legal, social, and economic requirement of women, to
other loci, is to make the most fundamental of alterations in our social
fabric. It is not at all surprising that churches, which are charged with
10. See Condit, Democracy and Civil Rights: The Universalizing Influence of Public Argumenta-
tion, 54 COMMUNICATION MONOGRAPHS 1 (1987). Hereafter I will revert to the tradition, practiced
in the era of constitution-founding, of capitalizing key value terms (called "ideographs" by rhetori-
cians). Hopefully, the theoretical importance of setting off these commitments in this fashion will
become more clear as this essay proceeds.
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the preservation of the existing social order, and other groups, which
have profited from women's reproductive labor, have provided significant
resistance to such a change. To counter fully this resistance requires ar-
gumentation that insists upon and defends the root value of women's
Liberty, not merely its presumption. 1
There is, however, a facet of this social change that transcends even
the self-interested opposition of the Right-to-Life groups, and it goes to
the heart of the law. This facet explains, I would suggest, why there is
currently so much dispute about appropriate approaches to constitu-
tional law. Enacting women's Liberty would require a complete revision
in our constitutional commitments. It would require that we re-envision
everyone's Liberty.
Professor Tribe, like most lawyers, journalists, and politicians, has
an excessively limited understanding of what abortion and women's Lib-
erty could imply. I do not mean here to suggest that Tribe is not com-
passionate, or that he fails to understand the suffering of individual
women who seek abortions. He makes plain at several places that com-
passion for individual women is at the root of his concept of women's
Liberty. 2 Rather, it is that Tribe does not understand that the protec-
tion of women's Liberty requires more than "law as usual," but rather a
revision of the political philosophy of individualism.
To walk our way into this issue, let us begin by considering the
weight that Tribe places on the "rational conduct" of women. At several
points he notices that conservative legal restrictions on abortion presume
that women will not make reasonable choices about abortion-either
they will act hastily,' 3 they will choose for frivolous reasons,' 4 or they
will misrepresent their situations.' 5 He responds that we ought to have
more faith in women's rationality than that.
Unfortunately, Tribe industriously overlooks the fact that women,
albeit often with the complicity of or under coercion by male partners,
routinely act "irresponsibly" with regards to procreation and abortion.
As Tribe admits, half the women who have abortions have not been using
11. The tactical advantage of assuming the value in some argumentative forums is admitted, but
it is also true that in some public forums we must address the root value in order to generate a
narratively coherent and discursively complete public vocabulary supporting the ways of life we wish
to enact.
12. See L.H. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 4041, 203.
13. Id. at 13.
14. Id. at 205.
15. Id. at 181.
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birth control.16 Some women use abortion for sex selection or for other
"frivolous reasons." The telling point, however, is that this is precisely
what true Liberty allows us to do-to make individual choices that are
less than optimal. Ideally, the only women who would "need" abortions
are those who experienced contraceptive failure after careful and sus-
tained use of multiple contraceptive methods. But given that we do not
live in an ideal world, and that people are not ideally rational (or that
they prefer short-term pleasure at risk of long-term pain), to predicate
Liberty upon rationally optimal conduct is to make Liberty impossible.
If women may have the abortion right only on condition that they always
exercise it "rationally," that is, in accord with what the majority of the
other people in the nation or state think they should do in a best case
scenario, then women do not have Liberty. No one imposes such a ra-
tionality test upon men.17 If men had to demonstrate that they would
routinely act in an optimally rational manner before being given a right,
we would live in a rather different nation.
There is, however, a crucial difference between women and men,
and this is why Tribe runs afoul with his comparison. Historically, the
laissez-faire version of Liberty as the dominant individual/state relation-
ship has worked for most men because they were truly "individuals."
The law restrained their freedom when they infringed upon the rights of
others, but otherwise men were at liberty to do whatever foolish or wise
things they chose to do.1 This formula for Liberty, however, does not
work for women. Women, traditionally and biologically, have strong
tendencies leading them away from individuality.1 9 Once she reaches the
16. Id. at 205.
17. Rational "person" standards are, of course, used in liability cases and the like, but these civil
cases are treated differently from the conflicts between state interests and fundamental personal free-
dons such as a right to vote or travel or choose a home, etc. where only certified insanity deprives
men of the liberty to choose.
18. This is not to say that men as boys do not need other human beings to survive, nor that they
do not profit from cooperation with others, nor that they do not come into the world in social
relationships (especially through language). The socialist analysis of subjectivity has pointed out
that all of these things provide boundaries to individuality. Within that framework, however, we can
say that men have managed to live with a great deal of individuality. The difference between men
and women on this point becomes clear if we note that we feel much more sorry for bag ladies than
for bums.
19. I do not suggest here that this biological tendency is related to anything other than the blo-
historical consequences of pregnancy and its reification through culture. That is, I know of no evi-
dence that women are "naturally more social" than men, etc. By bio-historical I mean a biologically
based relationship which is reified beyond the biological commitment by the fact of sharing history
during the biological relationship.
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point of "quickening," a woman is more than an individual.2" A mother,
by definition, is a person-in-a-relationship. Almost anything a mother
does (smokes cigarettes, eats chocolate, uses a jack-hammer, goes jog-
ging) affects another living entity, one that is becoming a person. The
case is different for men. Whether he experiences mere biological pater-
nity or culturally grounded fatherhood, a man's impact on and relation-
ship to the fetus is indirect. Consequently, it is not surprising that for
mothers, the male-derived formula of "my freedom stops at another per-
son's nose" simply is not adequate.
The mothering relationship, moreover, transcends pregnancy. As
Tribe recognizes, "Pregnancy does not merely 'inconvenience' the wo-
man for a time; it gradually turns her into a mother and makes her one
for all time."'" Most women develop a relationship with their children
that most fathers never gain. Much of this is culturally conditioned, but
some of it goes to the bio-historical link established in pregnancy and
breast-feeding. Motherhood is a cultural and bio-historical relationship,
whereas fatherhood is almost exclusively cultural.
22
As a consequence of the biological component, even women who
choose not to be mothers require cultural intervention in order to secure
the status of "not-mother." To avoid being a mother requires at least
cultural knowledge (e.g., the importance of abstinence and protection to
achieve it, methods of rhythm and withdrawal, or the Maginnis tech-
nique). Realistically, it requires a social system to deliver safe and effec-
tive abortion and contraception. To be a mother requires even greater
social services, as the mother must provide not only for herself, but also
feels compelled to provide for her children.23 Except where resources are
particularly lush, this requires grave sacrifice of "self." Some women
may not gain much individuation within motherhood even if given ade-
20. Vhether or not we see the fetus as a full individual in its own right, the historical signifi-
cance of the category of quickening indicates quite clearly, as does the testimony of individual wo-
men, that the fetus is experienced relationally from that point.
21. L.H. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 104.
22. Paternity and fatherhood are separable in a way that maternity and motherhood are not,
though even this may be a matter of degree, rather than a matter of absolutes. Even adoption leaves
women in a motherhood relationship because of the history of shared biological experience-which
is why many women vehemently resist adoption as an alternative to abortion.
23. When I assert this link as a biological predisposition, I do not mean to imply that it is a
biological determination. Culture can override biological tendencies, and often we feel it should.
Hence, a finding that women have a biological link that predisposes them to care for their children is
not a finding that we ought to construct a culture in which women have sole or primary responsibil-
ity for caring for children. Similarly, even if men do not share this biological predisposition, we
might choose to build a culture in which we established it by other means.
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quate social support, but one certainly cannot expect the majority of wo-
men to develop much individuality when they are required to submit to
complete "self"-sacrifice because of lack of resources.24
For women, therefore, laissez-faire Liberty is insufficient and un-
workable. If women are to have freedom, then substantive Liberty-im-
plying some level of social participation (and hence of governmental
activism)-is necessary. In the past, this nation, like most others, chose
not to provide women much Liberty, although we provided "protection"
in the form of marriage laws.25 Changes in abortion law are fundamental
to that Liberty because they are the ultimate guarantor that no woman
will have to be a mother against her will. However, abortion rights affect
women who will never have an abortion because they affect our coding of
female personhood. That coding in turn shapes women's Liberty in the
workplace and in choices of leisure activities (e.g., legal or illegal drug
consumption) as well as financial standing and almost all other activities
in which women do not now have Equality with men.
Abortion is currently central to our struggle over the definition of
female personhood because it is the most effective means of controlling
pregnancy, and pregnancy and childbirth are the only ways in which wo-
men are different from men in absolute function. All other differences
(strength, aggressiveness, intelligence, moral capacity) vary as much or
more among genders than between genders. Since pregnancy and child-
birth currently define woman qua woman, and not simply as "person,"
they can serve, and are serving, as the fulcrum by which women can be
distinguished from men and thereby discriminated against on a wide ar-
ray of fronts. To change that, to bring about what Justice White calls a
"free, egalitarian, and democratic society,"26 requires that we enact laws
protecting the liberty to control one's reproduction, because that will es-
24. I am aware that work by Carol Gilligan and others argues that women's cooperative moral-
ity is superior to men's rule-governed morality that is based on individuality, and that some people
argue that individuality is undesirable. See C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982); A.M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN
NATURE (1988). I disagree. I do not believe that either individuality or sociality are superior; I
believe they are each necessary and desirable traits that ought to be cultivated, and I believe they are
something that must be and can be developed, rather than merely something that happens naturally
to all human beings in any social circumstances. The inclusion of "childishness" as a component of
"femininity" is thus not merely a mask, but an enforced failure to develop individuality.
25. Basic liberties granted to women during the period in which the Constitution was framed
included protection of life and trial by jury of peers, but not of economic liberty or political rights
such as voting. The "protection" of marriage took away other liberties, such as freedom of move-
ment, by assigning them to her spouse.
26. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 793
(1985) (White, J., dissenting with Rehnquist, J.) (emphasis in original).
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tablish a legal status for women as persons, rather than as essentially
proto-mothers. Such laws, as the conservatives are quick to tell us, will
require a fundamentally different relationship between government and
the people.
Professor Tribe does not see the legal implications of women's Lib-
erty, for he is as blinded as any prominent lawyer by reverence for the
time-worn political theories grounding American law. To change these
basic political theories is threatening because it is almost always cast, by
opponents and many supporters, as "socialism." The cold war and the
decline of communist nations internationally have given us both sound
and unsound reasons to fear such a change. To some extent, the asserted
analogy between substantive liberalism and socialism provides a useful
warning that helps us to be precise and cautious. Women will be ill-
served by a social system in which "social good" outweighs "individual
good." In such a system, women's bodies are put at the service of the
collectivity (China and Rumania provide the real and chilling examples),
and that is hardly an improvement over having them at the service of
individual male "heads-of-households."
Socialism is, therefore, not an acceptable answer for women. In-
stead, we need a concept of individualism that treats Locke and Mill as
progressive stepping stones, rather than as static foundations. We need
to conceive of Liberty by focusing on individual development, not upon
escape from tyranny.27 We need a concept of substantive Liberty that
sees the government much in the way our Puritan forebears saw it-as a
way to protect each other from the wilderness.2" In a political system
organized around mutual protection of the substantive Liberty of indi-
27. See J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Bobbs-Merrill: Indianapolis,
1977) (1st ed. London 1690) (especially p. 7); J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY AND CON-
SIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (Dent: London 1982) (1st ed. London 1863).
28. See, e.g., "The Boston Massacre Orations, 1771-1783": J.W. Austin, An oration delivered
March 5, 1778 (Boston: B. Edes and T.J. Fleet); B. Church, An oration delivered March 5, 1773: To
commemorate the bloody tragedy of the fifth of March, 1770 (Boston: Edes and Gill); T. Dawes, An
oration delivered March 5, 1781 (Boston: Thomas and John Fleet); J. Hancock, An oration delivered
March 5, 1774: To commemorate the bloody tragedy of the fifth of March, 1770 (Boston: Edes and
Gill); B. Hichborn, An oration delivered March 5, 1777 (Boston: Edes and Gill); J. Lovell, An
oration delivered April 2, 1771: To commemorate the bloody tragedy of the fifth of March, 1770
(Boston: Edes and Gill); J. Mason, An oration delivered March 6, 1780 (Boston: John Gill); G.
Minot, An oration delivered March 5, 1782 (Boston: B. Edes and Sons); P. Thacher, An oration
delivered March 5, 1776 (Watertown: B. Edes); W. Tudor, An oration delivered March 5, 1779
(Boston: Edes and Gill); J. Warren, An oration delivered March 5, 1772: To commemorate the
bloody tragedy of the fifth of March, 1770 (Boston: Edes and Gill); J. Warren, An oration delivered




viduals, government would be required to allow maximal development
and substantive Liberty to all persons, but it would not be allowed to
interfere with the major choices individuals make about the conduct of
their lives.
I obviously cannot offer a full theory of such a system in a book
review. It will suffice here to note that any political system in which
public argumentation plays a serious role rests on its core values, and
hence can best be understood by focusing upon those values. The current
system in the United States is predicated upon individual liberty for "all
men" and places "non-interference" as the highest directive for govern-
ment; it is not fully successful (welfarism has encroached upon it, as has
statist regulation), but this core value still provides the central legal un-
derstanding. By contrast, a socialist system is predicated on placing the
collectivity as the central value, whether we call it state, community, so-
ciety, or nation. In advocating "substantive liberalism" as an alternative
to these two, I am advocating a political theory and practice that places
individuals as the central value, but which sees government as a mecha-
nism by which we may assist each other, rather than solely as a means of
protecting us from each other.
Substantive liberty thus specifies that government is not inaugurated
to allow us to develop on our own (the Locke-Mill variety). Rather, gov-
ernment is inaugurated to coordinate our cooperation with each other, in
order to create liberties for one another that could not exist in a natural
state. Such a rhetoric of Liberty specifies, and accurately, that all of the
wealth, knowledge, growth, etc. that any one of us creates is only possi-
ble because of the cooperation between individuals. Donald Trump
could not exist without public roads, building inspectors, government
support of higher education, federal research programs, and the U.S. mil-
itary. 9 Given that all individuals must cooperate in the creation of
human wealth to some degree, the society has an obligation to make Lib-
erty available to all persons, not merely to some. Consequently, society
has the obligation to make available to each individual the minimal re-
quirements for human Liberty. These are food, shelter, basic health care,
reproductive support, and education.
Beyond these basic minimums, each person must strive indepen-
dently in voluntarily chosen cooperatives. To limit the substantive ele-
ments of Liberty in this fashion is necessary for two reasons. First, the
coercive element of cooperation (and government is precisely coerced co-
29. Libertarians and anarchists argue for private efforts at such cooperation, but their private
cooperatives are simply governments under another name.
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operation) must be minimized in order to maintain Liberty. Second,
higher individuation requires self-directed effort.
There are, of course, practical problems in working out such a sys-
tem of substantive individualism. Increasingly, we recognize that re-
sources are not infinite, so that "development" opportunities cannot be
infinite.3" This means that there must be collective decision-making
about allocation of support services. In addition, by slanting the resource
availability, government can influence choices without mandating them.
These difficulties cannot be eliminated-they are part of the rub of living
on a planet with billions of other people. However, there are numerous
ways to mitigate these difficulties. A minimum guaranteed income, for
example, provides a centralized way of guaranteeing a broad range of
choices without government interference. Taking a different tack, we
might shift our welfare program to one that guarantees all children food
and medical care through an expanded school system. Whatever the
mechanics of the solution we arrive at, however, the fundamental re-
quirement is a reorientation of our collective commitments. Once we
adopt "substantive Liberty for all individuals" as a shared point of depar-
ture for our deliberations, we will have the potential for developing ap-
propriate social procedures.3"
Ultimately, to change our political system to give women Liberty is
therefore to change the legal system significantly. We are currently in
the process of doing this piecemeal. However, in order to do a more
reasonable job of adapting our law and social procedures to this change,
it is desirable for us to take the broad social view, rather than the narrow
legal-political one. The entire self-understanding of the legal establish-
ment runs against this grain. Clearly, the rise of "critical legal studies"
reflects a dent in the legal establishment, but the current legal quagmire
about judge-made law probably cannot be resolved by "critique" or
"deconstruction." Living in a collectivity requires shared values and vi-
sions, and no shared values and visions can withstand deconstruction.
32
30. The placing of individual human beings as primary does not necessitate the treating of other
entities-including the human community, animals, and the eco-system-as though they were with-
out substantive value.
31. I believe, with Michael Calvin McGee, that while public value terms are not logically
grounded they are nonetheless the stuff of human collective action. See McGee, The "Ideograph" A
Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology, 66 Q. J. OF SPEECH 1 (1980).
32. Defense of this claim would require a lengthy exposition on deconstruction, but it boils
down to the claim that deconstruction is based on the fact that all terms are defined in relationship to
other terms, especially their opposites, and therefore have no externally objectifiable veracity, which
the deconstructionists, therefore, (ironically) take to mean that they have no legitimate social force.
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Deconstruction provides a useful tool for finding out what is wrong; it
actively works against all means of re-envisioning collective action.
A powerful alternative is to return to seeing law as a species of argu-
mentation. Currently, lawyers follow the centuries-old Ramistic split
and conceptualize the law as logic rather than rhetoric. 33 Even decon-
structionist lawyers implicitly hold law to the standards of deductivism;
they simply make a great deal of its failure to meet those standards.
Outside of the legal educational establishment, however, there is a small
cottage industry reconceptualizing law as argumentation-as a species of
rhetoric.
34
To conceptualize law as a practice of argumentation is to see it
through the eyes of the court room lawyer rather than through the mi-
croscope of the appellate judge. It is to suggest that argumentation-the
employment of all of the available means of rational persuasion by multi-
ple advocates to affect the decision-making of third parties-is the best
possible means available to human beings for deciding issues of a forensic
type. Open argumentation does not guarantee certainty and the uniform
production of truth; it merely offers the best shot at a consensually legiti-
mate and reasonable decision that is available to fallible human beings in
areas where probability, multiple principles, and competing interests are
factors. Aristotle's promise cannot be improved upon-if advocates for
both sides of a case work diligently, the odds of the better cause emerging
triumphant are favorable.35
To view law as argumentation in this way may help to revise the
33. See M.A. Hasian, Jr., Legal Discourse and Public Argumentation: A Case Study of the
Rhetorical Creation of the Right to Privacy (Master's Thesis, University of Georgia, 1990). This is
true whether one conceptualizes the logic as being modem-scientific or classical-philosophical at the
ontological level.
34. See Zarefsky & Gallagher, From "Conflict" to "Constitutional Question'" Transformations in
Early American Public Discourse, 76 Q. J. OF SPEECH 247 (1990); R. HARIMAN, Performing the
Laws; Popular Trials and Social Knowledge, in POPULAR TRIALS: RHETORIC, MASS MEDIA, AND
THE LAW 17 (R. Hariman ed. 1990); Lucaites, ConstitutionalArgument in a National Theater: The
Impeachment Trial of Dr. Henry Sacheverell, in Hariman & Lucaites, Between Rhetoric and "The
Law' Power, Legitimacy and Social Change, Q. J. OF SPEECH (forthcoming 1990); Makau, The
Supreme Court and Reasonableness, 70 Q. J. OF SPEECH, 379 (1984); INTERPRETING LAW AND
LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER 339-410 (S. Levinson & S. Mailloux eds. 1988). For early
and varied formulations see Speech Communication Association, Dimensions ofArgument: Proceed-
ings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation (1981), as well as other editions of the
proceedings; issues of the journal ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY (formerly the JOURNAL OF
THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION); the "Project on the Rhetoric of Inquiry" as represented
in a new series of publications of the University of Wisconsin Press; and the variety of conferences
and publications coordinated through the "POROI" office at the University of Iowa.
35. ARSTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, I-I, 12-14. Though obviously the qualification that both sides
must have reasonable option to do a good job must be taken more seriously under a system of
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legal-political tunnel vision of lawyers, which derives from over-profes-
sionalization. As Stephen Toulmin's theory suggests, there are different
"fields" of argument.36 Many fields are highly technical as, for example,
the sciences, accounting, and clinical practices. Some fields, however,
partake not of "technical" knowledge, but of "social knowledge" as, for
example, elections, morals, and popular sports.37 The problem with the
legal profession is that it has come to define itself exclusively as a techni-
cal field. Law cannot be a technical field. Because it must regulate the
conduct of ordinary individuals, and because we operate in a society
where "the consent of the governed" is taken with seriousness, law must
partake both of social knowledge and technical knowledge. Conse-
quently, when Justices like Antonin Scalia employ the name of democ-
racy to refuse to listen to the voices of the demos on their doorstep, they
are either naive or hypocritical.3" The error Scalia has made is a typical
one. He believes that, because law is a technical field, the judge should
ignore those who are not technically qualified (and procedurally admit-
ted). On the other hand, along with most restrictive constructionists, he
believes that all questions that are tainted by issues of social knowledge
must be thrown back to the public sphere-the legislature. Thus, he
ends up in the awkward position of refusing to listen to the arguments of
the people who he says must decide the issue. Such a position is wrong
because, at both the trial stage and the appellate stage, law is based on
both technical and social knowledge. The appellate judge, the trial judge,
and the jury should be bound to deal conscientiously with both social
and technical components of judicial decisions. While agents of the judi-
ciary should not be bound by the preferences of the majority of the peo-
ple, they should be bound to listen thoughtfully to the various voices of
the people.
This requires, of course, an improvement in our understanding of
the Constitution. Presently, the Constitution is treated as a series of ma-
jor premises from which law is deduced. A better way of understanding
the Constitution is offered by Kenneth Burke. Rather than seeing the
document as a series of self-contained propositions, Burke notes that the
Constitution, like all linguistically embodied entities, is really a structure
substantive liberalism than it has been under laissez-faire liberalism. Note also that favorable odds is
not the same thing as a guarantee that "truth always triumphs."
36. See S. ToULMIN, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1972); S. TOULMIN, R. RIEKE, & A. JANIK,
AN INTRODUCTION TO REASONING (1979).
37. See Farrell, Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical Theory, 62 Q. J. OF SPEECH (1976); Far-
rell, Social Knowledge II, 64 Q. J. OF SPEECH, 329 (1978).
38. See Webster v. Reproductive Services, 492 US. -., 109 S.Ct. 3020, 3064 (1989).
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of motives.39 It is a collection of values, along with characterizations of
key agents, acts, scenes, agencies, and purposes, which must be worked
out in terms of human living conditions. Appellate law then consists of
assessing the extent to which different laws and actions are consonant
with that motive structure. These motive structures should be explored
by law schools, debated by law journals, and considered by judges.
This motivational perspective allows us to see the Constitution as a
founding document that serves as a weighty touchstone for our political,
legal and social lives, without treating it as a series of closed propositions.
A rhetoric of motives thus strikes the middle ground between rootless
nihilism (Le., law as political warfare) and reified objectivity (i.e., law as
timeless truth). The motivist approach may nonetheless appear threaten-
ing because, as we all know, deriving actions from values is a highly vari-
able endeavor. That frightens us, however, only because we have been
living with the comfortable but now largely exploded myth that deduc-
tion from premises is a determinate procedure. That myth has been
made laughable by reverses such as those in the line of cases from Dred
Scott to Plessy to Brown," by the restrictive constructionists' notable
willingness to make an exception to stare decisis in the case of Roe, and
by the routinely split decisions of appellate courts.
The myth of judicial deductivism is, however, worse than laughable;
it is destructive. The myth requires that we treat our constitution of our
collective self as a fait accompli. That is dangerous in a time of great
technological change.4" It is morally evil in a time where collective
moral progress is possible, because it prevents that progress.42 The polit-
ical conservatives have, as most progressives now recognize, simply been
employing the myth of judicial restraint (which is, procedurally, "deduc-
tivism") as a rhetorical ploy to stave off progress. It is time to stop treat-
ing precedent as a near-sufficient set of decision-making criteria. As
Bishop Whately noted, precedent grants one presumption in an argu-
ment," but it does not grant one fiat.
There is, of course, always the fear that judges will "personalize"
39. See K. BURKE, A GRAMMER OF MOTiVES (1969) (especially at 323-401).
40. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896);
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). It is also ludicrous when advanced by those who
would use the rationale to reverse Roe.
41. Hence the difficulties over urine tests, surveillance systems, new reproductive technologies,
etc.
42. See, ag., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See also Condit, Crafting Virtue: The
Rhetorical Foundations of Public Morality, 73 Q. J. OF SPEECH 79 (1987).
43. K WHATELY, ELEMENTS OF RHETORIC, part I, ch.3, § 2 (1872).
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their decisions. The first tonic for that fear is the realization that judges
already do. Because one always chooses among multiple possible prece-
dents, one necessarily engages one's personal motive structures even in
deductive approaches. What the vision of law as argumentation allows
us to do is to question the motive structures of those whom we would
appoint to the High Court, rather than ignoring these central elements of
decision-making under the pretense that their deductive-apparati are all
that will be in operation. There will remain judge-made law, but every
appellate judge is checked by the opinions of her or his fellows, and every
court is checked in a myriad of ways by elected officials, appointed offi-
cials, and the existence of other courts. Moreover, as the 19th century's
widespread disregard for the 14th and 15th Amendments revealed, the
courts are not able to exercise real power if they are too far out of line
with the dominant reading of the Constitution offered by the other actors
in the society. Our challenge remains, as in any humanly operated sys-
tem, to select people who will judge our arguments by our social stan-
dards of goodness and reasonableness.
To the extent that we fail to do this, we will be drawn into ever more
serious errors. One glaring illustration of this potential for error arises in
Tribe's failure to analyze the emerging discursive structures employed by
the anti-Roe court. Originally, the anti-Roe minority fell back on proce-
dural arguments. Using procedural objections to stall consideration of
an important issue is a time-worn rhetorical strategy for agents of a sta-
tus quo faced by superior principles. The case as presented to the Court
left the conservative Justices only the untenable option of declaring fe-
tuses persons,44 or the procedural gambit. Eventually, however, the con-
servatives have evolved a new approach, one which Tribe, because of his
legal-political deductivism, does not acknowledge.
In the Webster decision, Rehnquist made two moves. The first was
to suggest that the Court might find "fetal life" as "potential human life"
(not as a human person) to be itself an interest adequately compelling to
abrogate women's Liberty. While this is shocking to most progressives,
it is not particularly surprising given that Rehnquist's view is that wo-
men are mothers, and hence their identity is one already bound to the
care of "potential human life.",45 The conservative Justices were simply
being explicit here about the real values and interests at stake in the issue.
The leadership of the Right-to-Life movement has been moved to ex-
press their position as concern for the individual rights of the fetus be-
44. See L.H. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 113-38; C.M. CoNDrr, supra note 7, at 109-10.
45. See C.M. CONDrr, supra note 7, at 106-7.
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cause this is an appealing value position in an individualist society. This
is, however, a distorted portrayal of their values. The Pro-life move-
ment's leaders are interested in natalism-the birth of quantity of human
life; they are not avid defenders of individual rights." The conservative
Justices cannot use that false cover because of the greater analytic preci-
sion of the appellate legal field of argument. Hence, they are forced to
articulate the social interest in the potential for human life that women
generate. Tribe's neglect of this move by the conservatives reveals the
extent to which he underestimates the forces and interest of the political
Right and the motives of those Justices bound by "tradition."
The other move Rehnquist and the rest of the majority make is to
efface the distinction Tribe draws between "fundamental liberties"-
those which require compelling interests to override them-and lesser
liberty interests, which may be overruled by almost any state interest.
Rehnquist, in Webster, says "there is wisdom in not unnecessarily at-
tempting to elaborate the abstract differences between a 'fundamental
right' to abortion.., a 'limited fundamental constitutional right,'.., or
a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, which we believe
it to be."'47 This is a chilling claim, but it is an inevitable consequence of
judicial "restraint" in an era where the Constitution can no longer be
treated as a series of all-encompassing propositions. If, in an era of sub-
stantial social change, the conservative Justices actively interpret the
Constitution as leaving all unenumerated rights, or even all liberties,
open to "compelling state interests" as defined by legislatures, they re-
turn us to the tyranny of the majority.
The problem with any pure democracy, as political theorists ex-
tending back to Aristotle and Plato have recognized, is that it can be-
come a tyranny. American folk wisdom has placed democracy as the
opposite of tyranny, but that is largely an incidental consequence of the
rise of our governmental system in opposition to the British monarchy.
In practice, the reason for a constitutional form of government is to try
to use the wisdom of distance and time to protect individuals from the
heats of majoritarian tyranny. The system experiences strain, as it does
at present, when the distance and time become too great, and the Justices
who are its keepers read the Constitution anachronistically, but at least
the constitutional-judge system provides some protection from the fur-
thest extremes of the demos.
46. Id. at 61-63.
47. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. _, 109 S.Ct. 3020, 3058 (1989) (cita-
tions omitted).
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All this is not to say that democratic governance is bad. It is simply
to say that our national motive structure includes the values of "individ-
ual rights" and "justice" as well as "democracy." The concept of
"checks and balances" must, therefore, include an active judiciary.
Judges must exercise restraint by vetoing only those legislative encroach-
ments that truly infringe upon the ability of individuals to conduct the
broad courses of their lives. However, judges who allow all legislatively
preferred interests to be "compelling," or who deny that there are any
fundamental liberties, have abrogated their responsibilities under our
Constitution. The conservative Justice's concern for the "state" merges
indistinguishably with the socialist's concern for "the social good" and
together they go about oppressing living, breathing, individual human
beings. Given the increasing power that technology is giving the State to
intervene in private lives, the decline of Roe reflects more than the de-
cline of women's Liberty. It reflects an increasingly statist bent of the
Court that may threaten the Liberty of all persons. An advanced con-
cept of substantive Liberty based on the worth and dignity of individuals
and an understanding of law as a mixed bag of technical and social argu-
ment are needed to hold off the ever-more frequently compelling interests
of the State.
What stands behind Roe v. Wade is that complex. It requires an
understanding of the law that is that broad. Perhaps such analyses await
a new breed of legal scholars who are trained beyond the narrow confines
of law school deductivism. Meanwhile, Tribe does the best job to date of
out-running the conservative legal bean counters, and as such we can
only hope his broadly interesting book will also be a socially important
one.
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